Rethinking “Express Aiming”: The Ninth Circuit’s Briskin v. Shopify Decision Shakes Up Personal Jurisdiction for Online Defendants

The Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, has significantly altered the landscape for establishing specific personal jurisdiction over out-of-state defendants operating online. In its April 21, 2025, decision in Briskin v. Shopify, Inc., 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 9410, 135 F.4th 739, 2025 WL 1154075 (9th Cir. 2025), the court overruled a key aspect of its prior jurisprudence, making it potentially easier for plaintiffs to sue online businesses in their home forums.

Under prior Ninth Circuit personal jurisdiction, defendants operating national websites could argue that they were not subject to specific personal jurisdiction in a particular state unless the plaintiff could show the defendant had a “forum-specific focus” or engaged in “differential targeting” of that state. This meant that simply operating a nationally accessible, interactive website was not enough; there had to be something more to show the defendant specifically aimed its conduct at, for example, California in particular. This standard, notably articulated in cases like AMA Multimedia, LLC v. Wanat, 970 F.3d 1201, 1210 (9th Cir. 2020), presented a high bar for plaintiffs.

In Briskin, plaintiff Brandon Briskin, a California resident, bought clothing online from a merchant using Shopify’s e-commerce platform. Briskin alleged that Shopify, without Briskin’s consent, and knowing that his device was in California, installed cookies on his device, tracked his location and online activity, and used this data to create a consumer profile which it then sold.

The district court, applying the pre-Briskin standard, dismissed the case for lack of personal jurisdiction, finding no “forum-specific focus.” A Ninth Circuit panel initially affirmed.

The en banc Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal reversed, and in doing so, effect a significant shift in the law. The court explicitly overruled prior precedent like AMA, which had imposed a “forum-specific focus” or “differential targeting” requirement to establish “express aiming” under the “effects test” discussed in the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984). The Ninth Circuit in Briskin held that an interactive platform expressly aims its wrongful conduct toward a forum state when its contacts are its “own choice and not ‘random, isolated, or fortuitous,’ even if that platform cultivates a ‘nationwide audience[] for commercial gain.’”

Applying this to the case at bar, the Ninth Circuit found that Shopify conceded its geolocation technology allowed it to know Briskin’s device was in California when it installed cookies. Furthermore, Briskin alleged Shopify then used this data from a known California device/resident for commercial profit.

 This conduct, the court reasoned, was an intentional act, expressly aimed at California (by knowingly interacting with and extracting data from a Californian’s device within California), and caused harm Briskin suffered in California. The fact that Shopify operates a nationwide platform did not shield it, as its specific interaction with Briskin’s California-based device was key.

Accordingly, as it now stands in the Ninth Circuit, plaintiffs no longer need to show that an online defendant prioritized or differentially targeted their specific state over others to establish express aiming. If a defendant knows (or can know) that a user is in a particular forum and then engages in conduct directed at that user/device in the forum (like installing tracking software or extracting data), this can constitute express aiming.

The impact of Briskin was felt almost immediately. Just eleven days later, on May 15, 2025, the United States District Court for the Central District of California issued an order in Los Angeles Turf Club, Inc. v. US Racing, Case No. 2:21-cv-08303-FWS-DTB. At issue was a motion for reconsideration of a prior order where the District Court had denied default judgment, finding a lack of personal jurisdiction under the old “forum-specific focus” standard. Recognizing Briskin as an “intervening change in controlling law,” the district court granted reconsideration, thus changing course and granting plaintiffs leave to amend to meet the new standard under Briskin.