On June 11, 2025, the mouse (Disney Enterprises), along with co-plaintiffs Marvel Characters, Lucasfilm, Twentieth Century Fox Film Corporation, Universal City Studios, and DreamWorks Animation, filed a lawsuit for copyright infringement against AI image  generator Midjourney, Inc. in the United States District Court for the Central District of California. Disney Enterprises, Inc., et al. v. Midjourney, Inc.; C.D. Cal. Case No. 2:25-cv-05275.

In a blow to the owners of the rights to the film Gone in 60 Seconds, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that “Eleanor”—the series of Ford Mustangs featured in the film franchise—is not a character entitled to copyright protection. The May 27, 2025, decision in Carroll Shelby Licensing, Inc. v. Halicki, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 12766, F.4th (9th Cir. 2025), clarifies the high bar for a fictional “character” to be independently copyrightable, particularly when that character is an inanimate object.

The Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, has significantly altered the landscape for establishing specific personal jurisdiction over out-of-state defendants operating online. In its April 21, 2025, decision in Briskin v. Shopify, Inc., 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 9410, 135 F.4th 739, 2025 WL 1154075 (9th Cir. 2025), the court overruled a key aspect of its prior jurisprudence, making it potentially easier for plaintiffs to sue online businesses in their home forums.

In Woodland v. Hill, No. 23-55418, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 11911, — F.4th —, 2025 WL 1417103 (9th Cir. May 16, 2025), the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, in a published decision, affirmed the dismissal with prejudice of a copyright complaint. In the process, it offered some interesting observations on the access element of copyright infringement in light of evolving technology.

In a recent decision from the Central District of California, a Special Master imposed sanctions on attorneys representing the plaintiff in a civil case after they submitted legal briefs containing numerous inaccuracies, including citations to non-existent cases. The errors were attributed to the use of AI tools in preparing an outline of the briefs.

In an important (but perhaps not surprising) decision, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the U.S. Copyright Office’s denial of copyright registration for a work generated solely by AI. The court asked the question: “Can a non-human machine be an author under the Copyright Act of 1976?” Finding that registration would not satisfy the requirement that all registered works must be created by a human being in the first instance, the court found that the Copyright Office’s denial of copyright registration was proper.

One “exception” to the American rule is the “tort of another” doctrine. Under this doctrine, “[a] person who through the tort of another has been required to act in the protection of his interests by bringing or defending an action against a third person is entitled to recover compensation for the reasonably necessary loss of time, attorney’s fees, and other expenditures thereby suffered or incurred.” Prentice v. North Am. Title Guaranty Corp., Alameda Division, 59 Cal.2d 618, 620 (1963).

What happens if the copyright owner applies for copyright registration before the statute of limitations has run but the Copyright Office does not issue a certificate of registration until after the statute of limitations has run? That issue is scheduled to be argued before the United States Supreme Court on January 8, 2019.

Discerning the line between providing too much information in a trade secrets identification (and therefore potentially publicly revealing some of the proprietary information) and disclosing too little information (thereby risking dismissal or the need to amend a trade secrets disclosure) is more art than science

A plaintiff’s identification of trade secrets is one of the most important aspects of trade secrets litigation, as this case illustrates.

In the case of the DVR user, there can be no doubt that the DVR user alone decided to copy the copyrighted work. In the case of the Ubiquiti employee, it was almost certainly not an individual employee who made the decision to use Synopsys’ software, and he or she may have been wholly unaware that it was being used (not to mention that it was being used without authorization from Synopsis).

An owner of a copyright who transfers exclusive rights may still have standing to sue on those rights if the owner qualifies as a “beneficial owner” of those rights.

A new case from the Ninth Circuit illustrates that policy arguments cannot overcome the express language of a copyright license, and the difficult in asserting a copyright misuse defense. In Oracle USA, Inc., et al. v. Rimini Street, Inc., et al., 2018 WL 315568, F.3d (9th Cir. Jan. 8, 2018), the Ninth Circuit panel affirmed in part, reversed in part, and vacated in part the district court’s judgment after a jury trial in favor of Oracle USA, Inc., on its copyright infringement and state law claims against Rimini Street, Inc. and its CEO, Seth Ravin. Id.at *3. The opinion addressed issues of copyright infringement, violations, state law claims (California’s Computer Fraud and Abuse Act; the Nevada counter-part, the Nevada Computer Crimes Law; and California’s Unfair Competition Law), damages, interest, fees and costs, and injunctive relief.

The Ninth Circuit held that the plaintiff should have been given leave to amend to state with more specificity the similarities between the two works, and to plead facts that could describe a plausible chain of events linking the King Solomon treatment to defendants.