OpenAI Learns That “Cameo” Is Not a Generic Term
On February 14, 2026, Judge Eumi K. Lee of the Northern District of California granted a preliminary injunction barring OpenAI from using the name “Cameo” for a feature on its Sora video-generation application, finding that the celebrity video marketplace Cameo is likely to succeed on its trademark infringement claim. Baron App, Inc. d/b/a Cameo v. OpenAI, Inc., No. 5:25-cv-09268-EKL (N.D. Cal. Feb. 14, 2026). OpenAI has appealed to the Ninth Circuit.
The Parties
Cameo, operated by Baron App, Inc., is a digital marketplace that connects fans with celebrities through personalized videos. Since 2017, users have been able to request that a celebrity record a custom video (e.g., a birthday greeting, a marriage proposal, a roast, a tarot reading) and receive it through the platform. So, anyone who has an extra $450 lying around and a yen for a personalized greeting from Corey Feldman is in luck. The resulting videos are commonly referred to as “Cameos” or “Cameo Videos.” Cameo holds several federal trademark registrations for its CAMEO® mark, including standard character registrations that cover the word in all forms of display. TRO Order at 2–3.
Cameo’s social media accounts have millions of followers. Its service has been featured in thousands of media reports, including coverage on Saturday Night Live, The Tonight Show, and The Daily Show. Time magazine named it one of the “50 Most Genius Companies” in 2018. In 2022, Cameo expanded into AI-generated character videos through “Cameo Kids,” which offers personalized videos from animated children’s characters. TRO Order at 2–3.
On September 30, 2025, OpenAI announced an updated version of its Sora application, which generates AI videos from text prompts. The new version included a feature that allows users to create a virtual likeness of themselves and “open” those likenesses to other users on the platform, enabling anyone to generate realistic, personalized AI videos featuring that person. OpenAI recruited several high-profile celebrities to promote the feature. OpenAI named the feature “Cameo.” TRO Order at 3.
On October 10, 2025, Cameo sent a cease-and-desist letter. On October 22, OpenAI refused to rename the feature. Six days later, Cameo filed suit. TRO Order at 3.
The TRO and Preliminary Injunction
On November 21, 2025, Judge Lee granted a temporary restraining order, finding that Cameo had demonstrated a likelihood of success on its trademark infringement claim and that it would likely suffer irreparable harm absent injunctive relief. The court’s 16-page order applied the Ninth Circuit’s eight-factor Sleekcraft test for likelihood of confusion and rejected OpenAI’s descriptive fair use defense. OpenAI renamed the feature “Characters” following the TRO.
On February 14, 2026, after additional briefing and a hearing, the court converted the TRO into a preliminary injunction, extending the restriction through the pendency of the litigation. The preliminary injunction constituted a substantive judicial finding that Cameo is likely to prevail on the merits.
The Sleekcraft Analysis: Five Factors for Cameo, Zero for OpenAI
The Ninth Circuit evaluates likelihood of confusion under the eight-factor test established in AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341 (9th Cir. 1979): (1) the strength of the mark; (2) the relatedness of the goods; (3) the similarity of the marks; (4) evidence of actual confusion; (5) marketing channels used; (6) the degree of consumer care; (7) the defendant’s intent; and (8) the likelihood of expansion. Doctor’s Best, Inc. v. Nature’s Way Prods., LLC, 143 F.4th 1101, 1110 (9th Cir. 2025). The court found five factors favored Cameo, three were neutral, and none favored OpenAI.
Strength of the mark. The court found the CAMEO® mark at least “conceptually suggestive,” and therefore inherently distinctive, because the USPTO issued the registration without requiring proof of secondary meaning. It then found the mark commercially strong based on Cameo’s extensive media coverage, millions of social media followers, and cultural presence. TRO Order at 7–9.
Relatedness of the goods. This factor “weigh[ed] heavily” in Cameo’s favor. The court found that a portion of OpenAI’s “cameo” videos were “virtually indistinguishable” from Cameo’s videos: on either platform, a consumer can obtain a personalized celebrity video, such as a happy birthday message from Jake Paul or Mark Cuban—both of whom had offered videos through Cameo’s platform and had also “opened” their likenesses on Sora. Because Sora generates “hyperreal videos,” the court noted, a celebrity video from Sora may be indistinguishable from an authentic celebrity video from Cameo’s marketplace. TRO Order at 9–10.
Similarity of the marks. OpenAI did not dispute that its use of “cameo” was visually and phonetically identical to Cameo’s registered standard character mark. TRO Order at 10–11.
Degree of consumer care. The court found that consumers of short entertainment videos are members of the general public without any particular sophistication, and that because OpenAI was using an identical mark to generate related, and at times “virtually indistinguishable,” videos, a reasonably prudent consumer would likely be misled. TRO Order at 11.
Evidence of actual confusion. Cameo presented limited evidence, including social media accounts mistakenly tagged in connection with Sora’s “cameo” videos and a misdirected customer service inquiry. The court weighed this factor only “marginally” in Cameo’s favor, noting that evidence of actual confusion is “of diminished importance” at the preliminary injunction stage. TRO Order at 11–12.
The remaining three factors (marketing channel convergence, OpenAI’s intent, and product-line expansion) were neutral. TRO Order at 12.
The Fair Use Defense
OpenAI’s principal defense was classic fair use under 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4). To prevail, OpenAI had to show that it used “cameo” (1) otherwise than as a mark, (2) only to describe its goods or services, and (3) in good faith. Fortune Dynamic, Inc. v. Victoria’s Secret Stores Brand Mgmt., Inc., 618 F.3d 1025, 1039–40 (9th Cir. 2010). The court found that OpenAI failed on the second element: descriptive use.
OpenAI argued that it used “cameo” in its dictionary sense: a short video appearance. The court rejected this argument. The first dictionary definition cited by OpenAI, “a brief appearance of a prominent actor or celebrity, as in a single scene of a motion picture,” did not describe Sora’s feature because the feature generates a variety of short videos, including those that do not feature any celebrity. The second definition, “a usually brief literary or filmic piece that brings into delicate or sharp relief the character of a person, place, or event,” was not explained by OpenAI in relation to its feature at all. TRO Order at 13–14.
The court then identified a deeper problem: to the extent that “cameo” is broadly associated with “the ability to create short video appearances of people” in an online context, that association “may have derived from Plaintiff’s own CAMEO® mark, given the lack of a dictionary definition that reflects this particular meaning.” TRO Order at 14–15. In other words, the very meaning OpenAI relied on for its descriptive fair use defense may be a meaning that Cameo itself created. If so, OpenAI’s defense was circular: it was using the term “descriptively” only because Cameo had already made the term synonymous with personalized celebrity video content.
Irreparable Harm: “AI Slop and Deepfakes”
The irreparable harm analysis introduced a concern specific to the AI era. Cameo argued that its brand “is closely connected in the consumer’s mind with authentic celebrity-fan interactions,” and that OpenAI’s continued use of the mark threatened to associate the CAMEO® brand with “AI slop and deepfakes featuring celebrities.” Compl. ¶ 53. The court agreed, finding that OpenAI’s use of the mark for AI-generated videos would “irreparably shift consumer associations of CAMEO® from authentic celebrity videos to mass-produced AI-generated content.” TRO Order at 14–15.
The court rejected OpenAI’s argument that Cameo’s harm was merely economic. Harm to reputation and goodwill constitutes irreparable harm, and here the risk was that Cameo’s entire brand identity, built over nearly a decade around authenticity, would be overwritten by association with synthetic content. TRO Order at 15.
OpenAI’s only argument on the balance of equities was that the injunction would “harm OpenAI’s ability to successfully launch its Sora app.” The court dispatched this with a single citation: “Where the only hardship that the defendant will suffer is lost profits from an activity which has been shown likely to be infringing, such an argument in defense merits little equitable consideration.” Triad Sys. Corp. v. Se. Express Co., 64 F.3d 1330, 1338 (9th Cir. 1995). TRO Order at 15.
The Ninth Circuit Appeal
On March 12, 2026, OpenAI filed a notice of appeal to the Ninth Circuit (Case No. 26-1485). The following day, the district court stayed all proceedings pending the appeal. OpenAI’s core argument is expected to be that “cameo” is a common English word that no single entity can claim exclusive ownership over. The Ninth Circuit’s review will focus on whether the district court abused its discretion in granting the injunction—a deferential standard that typically favors the lower court.
Takeaway
The case is a straightforward application of established trademark doctrine to a new context, and that is precisely the point. The Sleekcraft test does not include an exception for AI companies, and a dictionary definition does not immunize a feature name that functions as a trademark in the marketplace. OpenAI’s argument that nobody can “own” the word “cameo” missed the mark. The court did not hold that Cameo owns the English word. It held that OpenAI used the word as a brand identifier for a feature that competes directly with Cameo’s service, and that the use is likely to confuse consumers. The distinction between describing a feature and branding a feature is the line that OpenAI crossed.
Baron App, Inc. d/b/a Cameo v. OpenAI, Inc., No. 5:25-cv-09268-EKL (N.D. Cal. Nov. 21, 2025) (TRO order); (Feb. 14, 2026) (preliminary injunction). Appeal docketed, No. 26-1485 (9th Cir. Mar. 12, 2026).

